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"LET ME REPRESENT YOU!" FLORIDA BAR v. WENT
FOR IT, INC.: SUPREME COURT SUCCUMBS TO STATE
REGULATION OF LAWYER ADVERTISING
Kim Y. Oldham
Advertising activity among members of the legal
profession has grown more popular as a marketing
tool over the past twenty years.' Lawyers no longer
simply place advertisements in newspapers and the
Yellow Pages.' Now, they rent billboards, send out
mass mailings, and broadcast radio and television
commercials.' In particular, the use of targeted, di-
rect-mailings' to individuals known to have an im-
minent legal need substantially increased during the
1980's and continues to be a common medium for
lawyer advertising.'
Today, lawyers are becoming more innovative and
more aggressive in their attempts to solicit clients. 6
Consequently, states are becoming more concerned
with the extent to which lawyers should be allowed
1 A.B.A. COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, LAWYER ADVERTISING
AT THE CROSSROADS 47 (1995) [hereinafter LAWYER ADVER-
TISING]. A 1993 Gallup Poll commissioned by the A.B.A. Jour-
nal revealed that 61% of surveyed A.B.A. members said their
firms participated in some form of advertising. Id. at 52.
' When lawyers first began to explore advertising in the late
1970's, newspapers and Yellow Page directories were the most
common media. Id.
3 Id. Other marketing devices include Christmas cards and
promotional items bearing the firm's name and the sponsoring of
public events. HARRY J. HAYNSWORTH, MARKETING AND LE-
GAL ETHICS: THE RULES AND RISKS 31-40 (1990).
' An advertisement uses some form of mass media to convey
a message to the public about a particular firm. LAWYER AD-
VERTISING, supra note 1, at 44. In contrast, a solicitation con-
sists of direct contact via telephone, in-person, or through the
mail. Id. Throughout this Comment, the term advertising will be
used to refer to all modes of communication, including
solicitations.
" Id. The 1993 Poll reported that seven percent of surveyed
lawyers use direct-mailings. Id. at 52; Larry Bodine, Advertising
Acumen, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at 9. This increase in the
use of targeted direct-mailings is due largely in part to the cost-
effectiveness of sending material through the mail, especially for
to reach out to individuals through various methods
of advertising.' The issue arises, however, of
whether permitting states to regulate lawyer adver-
tising constitutes an unwarranted suppression of
commercial speech.'
Prior to the mid-1970's, the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution did not include com-
mercial speech under its umbrella of protection." It
was not until 1976 that the United States Supreme
Court recognized the informational function of com-
mercial speech and granted it constitutional protec-
tion.1" Subsequently in 1977, the Court decided the
landmark case Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,"' in
which the Court held that advertising by lawyers
should be included in the category of commercial
new entrants into the legal profession and for small firms with
low capital. See generally Al H. Ringleb et al., Lawyer Direct
Mail Advertisements: Regulatory Environment, Economics, and
Consumer Perception, 17 PAc. L. J. 1199 (1986).
e See, e.g., In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265 (N.J. 1992)(lawyer
sent a solicitation letter to the father of a student killed in a
plane crash just one day after his remains were identified); Nor-
ris v. Alabama State Bar, 582 So.2d 1034 (Ala. 1991)(firm sent
flower wreath to funeral home along with note offering legal
services to family of 19-month-old decedent).
See infra notes 17 and 19 and accompanying text.
8 Commercial speech is defined as speech that is related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
' Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)(holding that
Constitution does not restrain government from banning the dis-
tribution of handbills bearing purely commercial advertising).
10 Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)(holding that commercial speech
serves not only the interests of the speaker, but also assists con-
sumers and furthers the societal interest of full dissemination of
information).
11 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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speech. 12 The ruling in Bates, however, was narrow
and the degree to which states may regulate advertis-
ing by lawyers has been a recurring issue before the
Court.' Essentially, the cases stemming from Bates
have circumscribed state regulation of lawyer adver-
tising so as to prevent in-person solicitation' 4 and
false or misleading communications.' However,
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,'" the Supreme
Court's most recent decision in the area of lawyer
advertising, may provide a basis to permit state bars
to impose further restrictions.'
7
In Florida Bar, the Supreme Court upheld a pro-
posed rule prohibiting lawyers from sending direct-
mailings to injured victims and their families within
thirty days following an accident or disaster.' Al-
though the decision presently applies only to Florida,
many state bar associations have already initiated ef-
forts to enforce similar restrictions. 9
This Comment evaluates the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Florida Bar and its ramifications on states'
role in regulating lawyer advertising. Part I traces
the history of the Court's past rulings regarding state
restrictions on lawyer advertising. Part II discusses
in detail the Court's rationale in upholding the
thirty-day ban in Florida Bar. Part III analyzes the
decision as a departure from the Supreme Court's
established precedent and explores its implications.
Part IV considers a less restrictive alternative to the
12 Id. at 364.
12 Since Bates, the Supreme Court faced the issue of state
regulating lawyer advertising six times. Marcia Coyle, Ad Deci-
sion Could Spur a Rollback, NAT'L L.J., July 3, 1995, at A26.
See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496
U.S. 91 (1990); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466
(1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S.
626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1977).
14 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978). See discussion infra part I.B.
"8 Bates, 433 U.S. 350; Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626. See discus-
sion infra parts L.A and I.C.
1e 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
" Coyle, supra note 13, at A26. Twenty-eight state and lo-
cal bar associations joined in an amicus curiae brief asking the
Supreme Court to give them more power to regulate lawyer ad-
vertising. A.B.A. COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, LAWYER ADVER-
TISING NEWS, June 21, 1995, at 1 (Special Supplement).
11 115 S. Ct. at 2381. The purpose of the waiting period, as
explained by Justice O'Connor in the majority opinion, is to
"forestall the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal
profession that the practice of direct solicitation only days after
accidents has engendered." Id. at 2379.
19 Paul M. Barrett, Split Court Lets States Curb Ambu-
lance Chasers, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1995, at BI. Among the
states with proposed amendments in the works are Arkansas,
Florida Bar's thirty-day waiting period to control the
use of targeted direct-mailings. This Comment con-
cludes that the Supreme Court's recent holding rep-
resents an open door that will stimulate states to
limit the means by which lawyers may advertise.
I. PRIOR LAW: BATES AND ITS PROGENY
A. Advertising General Routine Services
The issue of whether the First Amendment pro-
tects the contents of lawyer advertising was not ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court until 1977 in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona.2 The Court held that adver-
tising by lawyers fell within the category of commer-
cial speech and, therefore, may not be subject to
blanket suppression.2
In Bates, two lawyers established a legal clinic to
provide routine services at modest fees to persons of
modest income.2" To attract more clients, the lawyers
advertised their services and fees in a daily newspa-
per." The state bar filed a complaint on the ground
that the advertisement violated an Arizona discipli-
nary rule, which prohibited a lawyer from advertis-
ing his services through various means of commercial
publicity, including newspapers.24 Despite the law-
yers' claim that the disciplinary rule infringed upon
their First Amendment rights, a special committee's
California, and New Mexico. Id. Some states such as Alabama,
Colorado, New York, Michigan, and Illinois have created task
forces to review rules regarding the regulation of lawyer adver-
tising. A.B.A. Comm'n on Advertising, The Florida Bar Case
Stimulates State Action, LAWYER ADVERTISING NEWS, Aug.
1995, at 1. The Rules of Professional Conduct Review Commit-
tee for the District of Columbia Bar is considering a post-acci-
dent proposal similar to Florida's. Inadmissible, LEGAL TIMES,
June 26, 1995, at 3.
20 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
21 Id. at 383.
22 Id. at 354. "Routine services" are those such as uncon-
tested divorces and adoptions, simple bankruptcies, and changes
of one's name. Id.
23 Id. At the top of the ad in large bold print was the follow-
ing: "DO YOU NEED A LAWYER? LEGAL SERVICES
AT VERY REASONABLE FEES." Id. at 385.
24 Id. at 356. The rule provided:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or
associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine adver-
tisements, radio or television announcements, display ad-
vertisements in the city or telephone directories or other
means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or
permit others to do in his behalf.
Id. (quoting ARIZ. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-101(B), 17A ARIz. REV. STAT., p. 26 (Supp. 1976)).
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recommendation that both lawyers be sanctioned was
upheld by the Arizona Supreme Court.2" The law-
yers appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
where the state bar presented numerous justifications
in support of its restriction. 6
First, the state bar argued that price advertising of
even routine legal services tarnish the public image
of lawyers.27 Rejecting this assertion, the Court rea-
soned that because it is no surprise to most people
that there is a charge for legal services, informing
them that they may obtain such services at modest
fees will not harm the reputation of the legal
profession. 8
Second, the state bar claimed that because legal
services are unique to an individual's needs, any type
of lawyer advertising would be inaccurate and inher-
ently misleading.29 However, the Court determined
that the prices referred to in advertisements tended
to be for routine services at fixed rates, as in this
case, and were not generally misleading. 80 The
Court added that legal advertisements serve an im-
portant role in helping people make informed deci-
sions about hiring a lawyer."' Although it held that
truthful, nonmisleading advertising may not be sub-
ject to blanket suppression, the Court in Bates did
recognize that the protection was not absolute, and
that there may be "reasonable restrictions on the
28 433 U.S. at 356. The Court also rejected a claim that the
rule violated the Sherman Act because of its tendency to limit
competition. Id.
" The Court does not use the terminology used in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric to describe the three-pronged test for
commercial speech restrictions in its opinion because Central
Hudson Gas & Electric was not decided until 1980.
27 433 U.S.' at 368. The state bar argued that advertising
would cause a loss of trust and confidence in lawyers not only by
the general public, but also by clients who would view their law-
yers as being motivated solely by profit. Id. For example, one of
the most negative impressions about lawyers is that they are
money-hungry. LAWYER ADVERTISING, supra note 1, at 69.
Further, a juror in a personal injury case in Connecticut asked
to be excused because he had "no respect for damage cases and
the greedy lawyers who brought them." Gail Diane Cox, Battle
on Legal Ads Comes Down to Class, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1992,
at 45. When Bates was decided, lawyer advertising had long
been ingrained in the minds of practitioners and the public as
unethical and inappropriate. LAWYER ADVERTISING, supra note
1, at 48. Traditional notions of professionalism consisted of
maintaining dignity in the pursuit of public service. Whitney
Thier, In a Dignified Manner: The Bar, The Court, and Law-
yer Advertising, 66 TUL. L. REV. 527, 529 (1991); see also infra
part III.A.
28 433 U.S. at 369. The Court stated that the public would
likely view the legal profession negatively if it failed to advertise
and reach out to the community. Id. at 370.
20 Id. at 372.
S0 Id.
time, place, and manner of advertising. "32
B. In-Person Solicitation
The Supreme Court took advantage of the "time,
place, and manner" restriction set forth in Bates to
hold in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association8" that
while lawyers may not be categorically banned from
advertising, they may in fact be prohibited from en-
gaging in direct, in-person solicitation. 4 In Ohralik,
the bar association disciplined a lawyer who ap-
proached a recent car accident victim in the hospital
and convinced her to sign an agreement stating that
the lawyer would represent her.
3 5
Rejecting the lawyer's contention that his commu-
nication was similar to the advertising protected in
Bates, the Court distinguished the case on two
grounds. First, the Court reasoned that face-to-face
solicitation by lawyers carried with it the danger of
"overreaching, undue influence."" Unlike a printed
advertisement, in-person solicitation exerts pressure
upon the individual to respond immediately, without
opportunity for reflection. 7 Second, the Court ac-
knowledged that the states have an interest in main-
taining high standards among licensed profession-
als.38 Engaging in the intimidating solicitation of
Si Id. at 374. One of the goals of the A.B.A. is to assure
access to legal services for people of low and middle income.
LAWYER ADVERTISING, supra note 1, at 91. The Court also re-
jected the following justifications for upholding the ban in Bates.
1) adverse effect on administration of justice, 2) undesirable eco-
nomic effects, and 3) adverse effect on the quality of service. 433
U.S. at 375-78.
as Id. at 383-84. For example, advertisements of illegal
transactions are not worthy of First Amendment protection and
may, therefore, be suppressed. Id.
as 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
8, Id. at 468. But see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In
Primus, a lawyer for the ACLU met with a woman who had
been wrongfully sterilized as a condition of receiving Medicaid
benefits. Id. at 415. The Court held that a non-profit organiza-
tion's in-person solicitation of clients constituted protected politi-
cal expression and, thus, may not be prohibited. Id. at 424-25.
35 436 U.S. at 450. The victim later breached the contract
and hired another lawyer to represent her during settlement ne-
gotiations, but paid one-third of her recovery to Ohralik in the
settlement of his lawsuit against her for breach of contract. Id. at
452.
36 Id. at 457.
37 Id. In comparison with a solicitation letter, during an in-
person confrontation, the effect may be to provide a one-sided
presentation and encourage speedy decisionmaking. Id.
28 Id. at 460. The Court emphasized the unique role of law-
yers as officers of the court who are responsible for assisting in
the administration of justice. Id. Although in Bates, the image of
the legal profession was rejected as a justification, the Ohralik
1996]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
grief-stricken victims might erode the reputation of
lawyers in the eyes of the general public."0 There-
fore, the Court drew the line on lawyer solicitation,
permitting the Ohio State Bar to forbid in-person
communication. 0
C. Printed Advertisement Addressing A Specific
Claim
Notwithstanding the restriction on in-person solic-
itation, the Supreme Court continued to support
First Amendment considerations in the spirit of the
commercial speech doctrine. In Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Council of the Supreme Court of
Ohio,' the Court declined to permit states to ban
lawyers from placing advertisements in newspapers,
which are addressed to specific persons with specific
claims."' The lawyer in Zauderer placed an adver-
tisement in various newspapers specifically addressed
to women who suffered injuries from use of the con-
traceptive device known as the Dalkon Shield."3 The
Ohio Disciplinary Council filed a complaint against
Zauderer alleging that his advertisement violated
Court explained that where the ethical standards are linked to
the service and protection of clients, the standards "do further
the goals of 'true professionalism.' " Id. at 461 (citing Bates, 433
U.S. at 368). See discussion infra part III.A.
a See discussion infra part III.A.
40 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide:
A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact
solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional
relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's do-
ing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a)
(1989).
41 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
42 Id. at 647.
41 Id. at 631. The Dalkon shield was alleged to have caused
numerous pelvic infections resulting in infertility and miscar-
riages. Id. As a result of these ads, Zauderer received over 200
inquiries and initiated law suits on behalf of 106 women. Id.
44 Id. at 647. DR 2-103(A) prohibits a lawyer from "recom-
mend[ing] employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his
partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his
advice regarding the employment of a lawyer." DR 2-104(A)
prohibits a lawyer from accepting employment from a layman to
whom the lawyer has given unsolicited advice. Id. at 633.
45 447 U.S. 557 (1980)(finding that Public Service Commis-
sion of New York's prohibition of utility company advertising
that "promotes the use of electricity" is unconstitutional
suppression).
4e Id. at 562 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 412, 455-56 (1978)). The rationale behind granting com-
mercial speech less protection is that speech promoting commer-
cial transactions occurs in an area traditionally subject to govern-
ment regulation. Id.
rules against self-recommendation and accepting em-
ployment from unsolicited legal advice." However,
the Supreme Court held that Zauderer could not be
disciplined because the state bar's restrictions failed
to meet the three-pronged test set forth in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York."5
Commercial speech is accorded less constitutional
protection than are other forms of constitutionally
guaranteed expression.' 6 Consequently, state im-
posed restrictions on commercial speech, which is
neither false nor misleading,' 7 are analyzed with in-
termediate scrutiny under a three-part test.' First,
the government must have a substantial interest that
justifies the restriction."9 Second, the restriction must
advance that interest in a direct and material way.50
Third, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to
serve the state's interest.5" Under the Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric test, prophylactic bans have con-
sistently been viewed as overly broad and
unconstitutional.
52
The Ohio Disciplinary Council asserted the same
two interests which the Supreme Court found to be
47 See, e.g., the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a
communication is false or misleading if it:
a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or
omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as
a whole not materially misleading;
b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about re-
sults the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the
lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct or other law; or
c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' ser-
vices, unless the comparison can be factually
substantiated.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1989).
48 447 U.S. at 564-65.
49 Id. at 564. The Commission in Central Hudson Gas &
Elect. did have a substantial state interest in the conservation of
energy during a time when its demand was increasing. Id. at
568.
60 Id. at 564. The Court found a direct link between prohib-
iting promotional advertisements and the conservation of energy.
Id. at 569.
6" Id. at 565 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston-v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978)). The prohibition failed the third
prong of the test because it suppressed more information than
was necessary to advance the state's interest and it was not
shown that a more limiting regulation would not be as effective.
Id. at 570.
62 See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S., 466
(holding that state's categorical ban of targeted direct-mailings
was unconstitutional); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel, 471 U.S. 626 (holding that state may not prohibit truthful,
nondeceptive legal advertisements directed towards specific
claims).
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substantial in Ohralik's in-person solicitation -
preventing overreaching, undue influence and main-
taining professionalism among lawyers.5 3 Neverthe-
less, the Court refused to hold that the concerns re-
garding in-person solicitation were present when an
individual merely reads an advertisement in a news-
paper." Following Bates, the Court ruled that re-




In accordance with prior case law limiting state
regulation of lawyer advertising, the Court in Sha-
pero v. Kentucky Bar Association5 broadened com-
mercial speech protection to allow lawyers to solicit
clients known to face particular legal problems
through truthful, nondeceptive, direct-mailings."
The lawyer in Shapero sought approval by the Ken-
tucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for a letter
he intended to send to persons who recently had a
foreclosure suit filed against them."
Although the Commission did not find the letter to
be false or misleading, it refused to approve it on the
ground that the letter violated a then-existing disci-
plinary rule prohibiting lawyers from mailing adver-
tisements "precipitated by a specific event or occur-
rence involving or related to the addressee . . . as
distinct from the general public." 5 After the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's de-
cision, the United States Supreme Court confronted
the issue of whether a blanket prohibition of solicita-
471 U.S. at 641.
Id. at 642. The Court explained that "a printed advertise-
ment is a means of conveying information about legal services
that is more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on
the part of the consumer than is personal solicitation by an at-
torney." Id.
51 Id. at 647; see also Peel v. Attorney Registration and Dis-
ciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990)(holding that law-
yers are permitted to advertise that they are certified specialists
in specific areas of the law); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (hold-
ing that state may not prohibit lawyers from sending out an-
nouncement cards for the opening of a new office to individuals
other than clients, former clients, friends and family members).
5e 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
57 Id. at 473.
58 Id. at 469. The letter included the following: "You may
call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE
information on how you can keep your home. Call NOW, don't
wait." Id.
59 Id. at 469-70.
60 Id. at 471. The Kentucky Supreme Court did, however,
upon review, decide to replace Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) with ABA
Rule 7.3, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting business by
tion that is neither false nor misleading is consistent
with the First Amendment. °
Reemphasizing the distinction between face-to-
face and written communications, the Court held
that Kentucky could not ban lawyers from sending
truthful, nondeceptive letters to targeted individu-
als.61 Like the printed advertisements in Bates and
Zauderer, targeted letters do not present the same
substantial state interests present with in-person so-
licitations.6" The Court rejected the state bar's con-
tention that this case was merely "Ohralik in writ-
ing"6 subjecting potential clients to overreaching
and undue influence that may impair their judg-
ment.6"' On the contrary, the Court found that recip-
ients of direct mail solicitations did not read the let-
ters with the "coercive force of the personal presence
of a trained advocate,"6 and if they did not want to
read the solicitation, they had the option of merely
"averting [their] eyes." '66
Furthermore, the Court stated that the relevant
inquiry was "not whether there exist potential cli-
ents whose condition makes them susceptible to un-
due influence,67 but whether the mode of communi-
cation pose[d] a serious danger that lawyers will
exploit any such susceptibility."" In Shapero, where
the mode of communication was targeted direct-mail-
ings, it was concluded that no such danger existed.69
II. FLORIDA BAR v. WENT FOR IT, INC.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the im-
portance of free speech in lawyer advertising, re-
mail or in-person, when the significant motive is pecuniary gain.
Id. at 470.
" Id. at 475-76. See generally Victoria J. Kratzer, Shapero
v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n: First Amendment Protection for
Targeted Advertisements by Attorneys, 23 GA. L. REV. 545, 568
(1989)(reasoning that while the Court's decision is in accord
with prior decisions restricting state regulation, further expan-
sion of commercially protected speech is not likely).
e2 486 U.S. at 475.
83 Id. at 474-75.
04 Id.
Id. at 475 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
Id. at 47 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971)). See infra notes 107 and 111 and accompanying text.
07 Connecticut has a restriction that bars sending mailings to
people whose physical or mental health prevents them from
making reasonable judgments about hiring a lawyer. CONN.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (b)(1) (1986).
e8 486 U.S. at 474.
Cf. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2372 (explaining that




stricting the states' rights to regulate such advertising
except in limited circumstances.7 0 Now, at a time
when lawyers are becoming more creative and more
assertive, the Supreme Court has expressed a will-
ingness to permit states to take additional action in
order to curb abuses of lawyer advertising.
Shapero clearly stood for the principle that a state
may not categorically ban truthful, non-deceptive, di-
rect-mailings by lawyers. Yet the Supreme Court re-
cently upheld a restraint on lawyer solicitation re-
gardless of whether the communication was truthful
or non-deceptive in Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc.7 1 In late 1990, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted the Florida Bar's proposed rule prohibiting
lawyers from sending direct-mail solicitations to vic-
tims and their relatives for thirty days following an
accident or disaster.7 2 G. Steward McHenry and his
lawyer referral service, Went For It, Inc., filed an
action challenging the rules as being violative of the
First Amendment.
7 3
The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida upheld the Florida Bar's discipli-
nary rule as constitutional under the First Amend-
ment.74 Relying on Bates and its progeny, the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed .7  The
United States Supreme Court applied the three-part
test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric and con-
cluded, in a 5-4 decision, that despite established
precedent, the disciplinary rules were
constitutional.
7 6
The Court accepted two interests asserted by Flor-
ida Bar as substantial under the first prong of the
test. First, the state has a substantial interest in
70 See supra, part I.A.
71 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
711 Id. at 2374. The rules were proposed after the completion
of a two year study by the Florida Bar on the effects of lawyer
advertising. The report included the fact that out of the 700,000
direct-mail advertisements sent out in 1989 by personal injury
lawyers, 40% went to accident victims and their families. Id.
Also included were letters from angry recipients who character-
ized the solicitations as "an invasion of privacy" and "annoying
and irritating." Id. at 2377.
78 Id. McHenry was disbarred in 1992 for sexual miscon-
duct and John T. Blakely took his place during the course of
this action. Id.; Coyle, supra note 13, at A26.
", Went For It, Inc. v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543
(M.D. Fla. 1992).
75 Went For It, Inc. v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir.
1994).
76 115 S. Ct. 2371.
17 Id. at 2376.
78 Id. Before the lower courts, the Florida Bar also asserted
that it had an interest in protecting vulnerable, grief-stricken in-
dividuals from overreaching, undue influence. 21 F.3d at 1042-
43. Cf. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 474
"protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal
injury victims and their loved ones against intrusive,
unsolicited contact by lawyers." ' Second, because
the general public would view such intrusive conduct
upon vulnerable victims as unprofessional, the repu-
tation of lawyers would deteriorate.
7 8
The Court subsequently concluded that Florida
Bar's detailed empirical data supported its conten-
tion that the thirty-day waiting period would in fact
advance the state's interests in a direct and material
way, thereby meeting the second prong of the test.
7
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that less re-
strictive means were available to serve the state pur-
ported interest and held that the thirty-day waiting
period was "reasonably well-tailored."80
Although Shapero struck down a ban on targeted
direct-mailings, the Court distinguished the case in
three respects. First, Shapero focused more on the is-
sue of overreaching, undue influence, whereas the
main concern in Florida Bar was avoiding an inva-
sion of privacy." Second, the ban in Shapero was a
complete ban, regardless of the time or the recipient.
In contrast, the Florida Bar rules only prohibited
targeted, direct-mailings to injured accident victims
and their families for thirty days. 2 Finally, unlike
the Florida Bar, the Kentucky Bar Association in
Shapero offered no concrete empirical data that di-
rect-mail solicitations would result in any of the
harms it alleged in support of its complete ban.'
In dissent, Justice Kennedy8' argued that the ma-
jority's opinion amounted to an unconstitutional cen-
sorship of commercial speech.8" According to Ken-
nedy, the majority's attempt to distinguish Shapero
(1988) (stating whether condition of recipients may subject them
to undue influence is not appropriate line of inquiry).
78 115 S. Ct. at 2378. But see infra note 88 and accompany-
ing text.
80 Id. at 2380. Respondents proposed distinguishing recipi-
ents based on the severity of injuries and of grief, allowing di-
rect-mailings to those whose pain and suffering was relatively
minor. Id. Such lines, in the Court's opinion, would be difficult
to draw. Id. Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, while criticizing this
reasoning as irrelevant, pointed out that similar distinctions are
made in criminal law regarding degrees of bodily harm. Id. at
2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 2378.
82 Id.
88 Id. See generally Jeffrey S. Kinster, Targeted, Direct-
Mail Solicitation: Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n Under Attack,
25 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. I (1993)(noting that state courts are ruling
contrary to Shapero in an effort to punish distasteful conduct
among soliciting lawyers).
84 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined in the dis-
senting opinion. 115 S. Ct. at 2381 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 2383. According to Justice Kennedy, it is the pub-
lic, not the state, who has the right and power to decide which
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was unavailing. 6
Kennedy first argued that the mere potential for
an invasion of privacy upon victims and their fami-
lies during their time of grief was not a sufficient
justification for suppressing speech. 7 Second, the
"self-serving," "selective" data offered by the Florida
Bar fails to establish either that a real danger exists
or that the thirty-day ban would directly and materi-
ally help cure the danger. 8 Third, the ban was not
reasonably tailored to advance the state's interests
because it suppressed far more speech than was nec-
essary. 9 As a result, victims who wanted and needed
to begin assessing their legal positions were being de-
prived of communication that could be informative of
their rights and options.' 0
Kennedy also attacked the majority's attempt to
shield the legal profession from public criticism"
and responded that "real progress begins with more
rational speech, not less."' 2 He concluded that not
only was the majority's decision a departure from
prior decisions, "but also from the principles that
govern the transmission of commercial speech.""'
III. NEW INTERESTS WILL SPUR NEW
RESTRICTIONS
The Supreme Court's ruling in Florida Bar, while
ideas and information are deserving of their audience. Id. at
2386; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993)(deter-
mining that the speaker and the audience assess the value of the
information presented, not the government).
8e 115 S. Ct. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 2383; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648
(1985) (stating that the mere possibility that some members of
the public might find advertising offensive does not justify sup-
pressing it).
88 115 U.S. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). William
Hornsby, staff counsel to the ABA's Commission on Advertising,
agrees with Justice Kennedy and criticizes the research company
hired by the Florida Bar, which was also the same company
hired by the Iowa State Bar to prove that evidence existed to
.support advertising restrictions. Mary Hladky, Restrictions on
Lawyer Advertising May Grow, DAILY Bus. REV., June 27,
1995, at A7. As one commentator noted, the survey "conspicu-
ously neglected inquiry into the percentage of direct-mail recipi-
ents who were pleased to be alerted to their legal options . .. ."
Bruce Fein, Lawyer Advertising Crackdown Looks More Like a
Protectionist Masquerade, DAILY Bus. REV., July 28, 1995, at
A28.
89 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). Kennedy argues that
there is "no justification for assuming that in all or most cases an
attorney's advice would be unwelcome or unnecessary when the
survivors or the victim must at once begin assessing their legal
it may have only limited application, goes against the
spirit of the modern commercial speech doctrine as it
has been applied to legal advertising. In the past, as
long as the advertisements or direct-mailings were
truthful and not misleading, the Court rejected any
arguments that state restrictions were necessary. 4
Notwithstanding its past decisions, the Supreme
Court has now recognized that substantial state in-
terests do exist to support restraints on even truthful,
nonmisleading advertising.
A. Lawyers and Their Flagging Reputations
In the eyes of the legal community, the public's
image of the legal profession has declined over the
past ten years.95 In particular, there has been a dra-
matic decline in the past two years as lawyer adver-
tising has increased. 9' Although it did not alter the
three-part test governing the regulation of commer-
cial speech set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric, the Supreme Court has, for the first time, found
that the reputation of the legal profession is a sub-
stantial state interest that justifies suppressing truth-
ful, printed commercial speech."7
In Bates, the Supreme Court expressly rejected
the Florida Bar's assertion that allowing lawyers to
advertise would harm the reputation of the legal pro-
and financial position in a rational manner." Id. On the con-
trary, it is at this urgent time that they would appreciate the




9" Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court Upholds Limit
on Lawyer Pursuit of Accident Victims, CHI. TRIB., June 22,
1995, § 1, at 5.
95 LAWYER ADVERTISING, supra note 1, at 63. In a speech
at the University of Tennessee, former Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger expressed his concern with "the outrageous breach of
professional conduct we see in the huckster advertising of some
attorneys." Linda Greenhouse, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMEs, June
23, 1995, at A23.
9e LAWYER ADVERTISING, supra note 1, at 66. The most
dramatic change occurred between 1991 and 1993, where public
opinion of lawyers dropped almost twice as much as it did be-
tween 1976 and 1991. Id. at 65. Interestingly enough, those who
had favorable opinions about lawyers were low income minori-
ties most likely to have received information through legal adver-
tising. Id. at 66.
01 A.B.A. Comm'n on Advertising, supra note 19, at 2. Jus-
tice O'Connor has maintained this view since her dissent in Sha-
pero, where she expressed that restrictions on advertising would
serve an important role in the preservation of the integrity legal
profession. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 491
(1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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fession.9 In the Court's opinion, "the postulated
connection between advertising and the erosion of
true professionalism [was] severely strained."99 Fur-
thermore, the Court acknowledged that members of
other professions such as bankers and engineers ad-
vertise, yet they are not scrutinized by the public
eye.100
Similarly, in Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Court
held that while Virginia has an interest in maintain-
ing professional standards among its licensed phar-
macists, the interest does not justify the suppression
of drug price advertisements."' Although the state is
free to "require whatever professional standards it
wishes of its pharmacists . . . it may not do so by
keeping the public in ignorance .... ."101
While the Court recognized in Ohralik that the
reputation of the legal profession is a substantial
state interest,'03 this recognition arose solely because
of the sufficient link to the unique concerns present
in the limited instances of face-to-face solicita-
tions.'0 4 More than mailed solicitations, knocking on
house and hospital doors of vulnerable, traumatized
victims and pressuring them to seek legal representa-
tion comes closer to falling below acceptable levels of
professional conduct and common decency. Here, the
connection between the conduct and the erosion of
true professionalism was not so strained. But it was
in the unique case of in-person communication that
the Court was willing to appreciate the preservation
of the legal profession's image as justification for im-
posing state restrictions on lawyer advertising.
However, the Court in Florida Bar was willing to
recognize the protection of the legal profession as
98 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 369 (1977).
Dave Decker, president of the Illinois State Bar Association, be-
lieves that lawyer advertising has become sleazy, damaging the
image of the profession. He stated, "efforts at soliciting people
who have just been victimized by terrible injury or death are
totally indefensible." Crawford Greenburg, supra note 94, at 1.
00 433 U.S. at 368.
100 Id.
101 Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumers
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976).
102 Id. at 770. As in later cases, Virginia Pharmacy Board
declined to hold that commercial speech could never be regu-
lated. Id.
10' Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460
(1978).
104 Id. at 461.
105 Coyle, supra note 13, at A26; Norry Miller, More Chal-
lenges Likely After Supreme Court Decision in Florida Attorney
Advertising Case, LIBELLETTER, July 1995, at 10.
10 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
107 Eugene Volokh, a professor at UCLA Law School be-
lieves that to protect privacy by restricting speech, the intrusion
into privacy should be a serious one. Preserving the Sanctity of
justification for restrictions on direct-mailings. Be-
cause "preservation of the legal profession" is some-
what vague, it has a dangerous potential of being
broadly interpreted to support a wide range of com-
mercial speech restrictions0 5
B. Privacy and Tranquility
The Court also held that potential invasions of
privacy present a substantial state interest which jus-
tifies upholding the thirty-day ban.'09 The initial
question is whether the mere receipt of a direct-
mailing actually results in an invasion of one's pri-
vacy.10 7 A targeted letter may be viewed as resulting
in no more of an invasion of privacy than that which
occurs while reading a newspaper or a letter mailed
to the public at large.'08 The Court reasoned that "a
brief journey to the trash can" does little to prevent
the recipient from being offended.' 0 9 Thus, it ap-
pears the Court's main concern, more than prevent-
ing an invasion of privacy, was to protect a vulnera-
ble reader from what may be considered offensive
speech." 0
However, as Kennedy pointed out in his dissent,
prior rulings have established that the government
cannot obstruct the flow of mailings to protect recipi-
ents who might be potentially offended."' In
Zauderer, the Supreme Court stated, "[a]lthough
some sensitive souls may have found appellant's ad-
vertisement in poor taste, it can hardly be said to
have invaded the privacy of those who read it.""'
While some may view the thirty-day grace period as
the Mailbox, LEGAL TIMES, July 31, 1995, at 40. While the
receipt of a single solicitation letter may be annoying, it is not a
serious threat to privacy. Id. The Court of Appeals in Florida
Bar reasoned that any invasion "occurs when the lawyer discov-
ers the recipient's legal affairs, not when he confronts the recipi-
ent with the discovery." Went For It, Inc. v. Florida Bar, 21
F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476).
108 Id.
109 115 S. Ct. at 2379.
110 Preserving the Sanctity of the Mailbox, supra note 108,
at 40.
1 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing
Bolger v. Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983)). In Bolger,
a manufacturing company sent pamphlets out to members of the
general public advertising its contraceptive devices. Although the
Court realized that some recipients might find them offensive,
the advertisements were deemed protected commercial speech
under the First Amendment. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71; see also
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)(holding
that where obscenity is not involved, offensiveness is not a valid
justification for suppressing speech).
112 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council of the Su-
preme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985).
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a way to curb a sleazy form of ambulance chasing,"'
others, including Kennedy, view it as denying access
to legal representation to those who may not be
offended.
Furthermore, any invasion of privacy that may oc-
cur from mailings sent by interested lawyers imme-
diately after an accident is just as likely to occur
from the immediate contact victims have with insur-
ance companies. "" Insurance adjusters are often
quick in their attempt to persuade injured victims or
family members to settle their claims before they
have had a chance to seek legal representation." 5
Also, in an effort to gather relevant, fresh evidence,
opposing counsel often begins immediate investiga-
tion in contemplation of litigation. " ' There is no
reason to believe that an individual suffering a recent
trauma is going to be any less irritated by the
badgering of insurance adjusters and opposing coun-
sel than by lawyers offering their services. There-
fore, unless a similar ban is enforced against other
groups, the thirty-day ban against lawyers will not
succeed in protecting the privacy and tranquility of
traumatized victims.
17
C. Impact of Florida Bar
The effects of the Florida Bar decision are already
emerging. As in Florida, the Texas Legislature pro-
posed to curb abuses of direct-mail solicitations by
including in the state's Penal Code a provision
preventing lawyers from sending targeted mailings to
victims for the first thirty days following an acci-
dent."' A group of attorneys challenged the constitu-
tionality of the provision on the ground that it hin-
ders their communication with potential clients."19
The United States District Court for the Southern
11 Preserving the Sanctity of the Mailbox, supra note 107,
at 39.
11" A Protected Bar, NAT'L L.J., July 3, 1995, at A20.
118 Id.; see also Gary Taylor, Texas Solicitation Ban is
Voided, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 7, 1994, at 3. In one instance similar
to that of the lawyer in Ohralik, an insurance adjuster came to
the hospital room of a victim just one day after a car accident.
Id.
116 Fein, supra note 88, at A28.
117 In addition, because Florida Bar applies only to personal
injury lawyers, a lawyer may still send out solicitation letters at
any time to those who are thought to have an immediate need
for legal representation, such as individuals on the verge of
bankruptcy or who have been arrested for drunk driving.
Hladky, supra note 88, at Al.
118 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12(d)(2)(A) (West 1994).
The provision is unique in that it attempts to criminalize abuses
of direct-mail solicitations rather than impose disciplinary sanc-
District of Texas held that the provision was uncon-
stitutional under the First Amendment as violative of
commercial freedom of speech.12 ° However, in light
of Florida Bar, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit applied the three-part test from
Central Hudson and reversed, concluding that the
provision was constitutional. 2
Comparing these facts to Florida Bar, the Court
of Appeals reasoned that Texas had a substantial in-
terest in protecting the privacy of recently injured
victims and their families from unsolicited contact by
lawyers, and that the penal code provision directly
and materially advanced that interest.1 2 The chal-
lenging lawyers distinguished Florida Bar by argu-
ing that, unlike Texas, the Florida Bar produced
sufficient empirical data to establish that its interests
were substantial.12 Nevertheless, the Court of Ap-
peals accepted the numerous complaints and testimo-
nies regarding the effects of direct-mail solicitations
as ample evidence to satisfy the first two prongs of
the Central Hudson test.1
24
The lawyers also attacked the third prong of the
test, arguing that because accident victims in Texas
may indicate on the accident report that they do not
want to be solicited, the provision is not narrowly
tailored to advance the state's interest in protecting
their privacy.' 2 5 Rejecting this contention, the Court
of Appeals explained that the goal of the provision is
to protect not only the victims, but also their family
members, whose signatures do not appear on the ac-
cident report.
1 26
Following this framework, other states will most
likely be successful in imposing similar thirty-day
waiting periods for direct-mail solicitations. It is un-
certain, however, as to how effective and flexible
Florida Bar will be in supporting restrictions on
other forms of advertising such as television commer-
tions. Taylor, supra note 115, at 3.
119 Moore v. Morales, 63 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1995). The
provision also applied to physicians, surgeons, chiropractors, and
private investigators, but no other group challenged the ban. Id.
at 360. The lawyers also challenged proposed provisions which
restricted access to accident reports for 180 days and prevented
direct-mailings from being sent to criminal and civil defendants
for 30 days. However, only the provision regarding the solicita-
tion of accident victims was on appeal. Id. at 360.
120 Moore v. Morales, 843 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
121 63 F.3d at 361.
122 Id.
128 Id. at 362.
124 Id. at 363.
125 Id.
126 Id. The court of appeals also noted that "narrowly tai-
lored" does not necessarily mean the least restrictive means. Id.
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cials. '2 Because the Court emphasized that a wide
range of alternatives to direct mailings are available
to lawyers, 128 the decision may not support other
types of restrictions."'
However, Florida Bar does leave some room for
flexibility. Although the decision is limited to
targeted direct-mailings by personal injury law-
yers, Is Florida Bar at least established that state
regulations are no longer limited to deceptive or mis-
leading advertising as they have been for the past
eighteen years.' 3 '
IV. "ATTENTION: THE FOLLOWING
CONTAINS ADVERTISING MATERIAL"
Florida's thirty-day ban is too broad, suppressing
more speech than is necessary to achieve the pur-
ported interests. Therefore, it is appropriate to con-
sider other means by which states could safeguard
the public while still abiding by the First Amend-
ment protections. A less restrictive alternative to ban-
ning targeted, direct-mailings may be a pre-screen-
ing of solicitations, by requiring lawyers to send a
copy of their proposed letters to the state or local bar
12I A case is currently pending in the Northern District of
Florida challenging limitations placed on television ads, includ-
ing a ban on dramatization. Gary Blankenship, Panel to Take
Fresh Look at Ad Rules, FLORIDA BAR NEWS, July 15, 1995,
at 5. Although the Florida Bar would like to abolish television
ads altogether, it would be satisfied with restricting ads to in-
clude just a name, address, and phone number. John D. McKin-
non, BAR LEADERS PUT LAWYERS' ADS ON TRIAL, Miami
Herald, July 19, 1995, at 5B.
128 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2380
(1995). As argued by Justice Kennedy however, the fact that the
Court acknowledged other means of getting important legal in-
formation to potential clients, it conceded "the necessity for the
very representation the attorneys solicit and the State seeks to
ban." Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
129 A.B.A. Comm'n on Advertising, supra note 19, at 2.
David Singer, a personal injury lawyer in Hollywood, views
Florida Bar as a very narrow decision serving only to protect
grief-stricken victims from an invasion of privacy and inapplica-
ble to any restrictions on electronic media. Hladky, supra note
88, at A6. In contrast, the Florida Bar's opinion is that the re-
cent decision's language has much broader applications. Id.
180 The 30-day ban does not apply to Florida lawyers who
send at least 400,000 solicitation letters each year to people who
are arrested or are on the verge of bankruptcy. Id. at Al.
"I1 Richard C. Reuben, Florida Bar's Ad Restriction Consti-
tutional, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 20.
132 See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476
(1988); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Bassett Hamilton, Read-
ing Beyond the Labels: Effective Regulation of Lawyers'
Targeted Direct Mail Advertising, 58 U. CoLo. L. REV. 255,
274 (1987)(comparing pre-screening to that used by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission which requires the filing of
association. 182
However, this procedure poses three problems.
First, pre-screening would require reviewers to dis-
tinguish "the truthful from the false, the helpful
from the misleading, and the harmless from the
harmful."188 This task would not only be burden-
some and time-consuming, but such a task would
also require the hiring and instruction of an exper-
ienced, competent staff.18 Second, there would inevi-
tably be challenges that the advance review consti-
tutes prior restraint because the review is being used
to suppress constitutionally protected speech. 5
Third, the reviewing committee's speculation as to
an intrusive invasion of privacy upon a person may
not in fact be how the targeted recipient would re-
act."36 No individual can better assess his or her
emotional state of mind than him or herself. Conse-
quently, as Kennedy anticipated, those individuals
who might welcome the information will be deprived
of receiving it.
A second alternative would in fact provide a safe-
guard against a serious invasion of one's privacy and
still allow the solicitation to get to those who need
and want the information. Currently enforced in
proxy solicitations before distribution to security holders). Cur-
rently, Iowa requires that a copy of the communication be sent
to the Commission on Professional Ethics and Conduct contem-
poraneously with the mailing. A.B.A. COMM'N ON ADVERTIS-
ING, Provisions of State Codes of Professional Responsibility
Governing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation (1994 Supp.).
Kentucky offers lawyers the option of either conforming their
communications to what is specifically allowed under the rules,
or delivering a copy of their proposed communication to the At-
torneys Advertising Commission for approval prior to mailing.
Id.
183 486 U.S. at 478 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646
(1985).
184 Perschbacher & Hamilton, supra note 132, at 276. But
see Shapero, 486 U.S. at 477 (determining that there is no evi-
dence that the scrutiny of targeted solicitation letters will be
more burdensome or less reliable than the scrutiny of
advertisements).
185 Perchbacher and Hamilton, supra note 133. However,
commercial speech does not warrant full protection under the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646
(1985) (commercial speech is entitled to the protection of the
First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less than that
afforded non-commercial speech); Bolger v. Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983) (Constitution accords less protection
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded
forms of expression).
136 The Florida Bar opinion itself did not contain an exam-
ple of what a restricted solicitation letter might look like because
the suit did not arise out of a particular disciplinary action over
a specific letter. Barret, supra note 19, at B1.
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some states, the practice entails requiring the words
"ADVERTISEMENT" or "ADVERTISING
MATERIAL" to be included on the front of the en-
velope and at the top of the first page of the written
solicitation, no matter when it is sent.187 Upon re-
ceipt of the direct-mailing, an inquisitive victim or
relative may read on, while a traumatized person
may discard it.
The advertising label alerts readers and prevents
solicitation offers from being automatic encroach-
ments upon the private suffering of accident victims
and their families. The Court in Florida Bar noted
that while a recipient may simply throw away the
solicitation, offense has already been taken as a re-
sult of the recipient having already read the letter in
order to decide what to do with it."' 8 The advertising
label alleviates this problem by notifying the recipi-
ent of the nature of the communication without re-
quiring any further reading.
At the same time, individuals, if they so choose,
are free to read on and determine what alternatives
and resources are available to them. Ideally, this
137 See, e.g., ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 7.3 (c) (1993); HAW. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 7.3 (c) (1994)(a copy of the communication must also be
forwarded to the Disciplinary Council); IOWA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (B)(4)(d) (1989)(the
words must appear in red ink); LA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 7.2 (b)(iii)(B) (1994)(the solicitation must be
"plainly marked"); MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 7.2 (0 (1993)(word must appear "clearly and conspicu-
ously"). These provisions follow the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct which provide:
Every written or recorded communication from a lawyer
soliciting professional employment from a prospective cli-
method meets the concerns of both the majority and
dissenting opinions, and is far less restrictive than is
Florida's thirty-day ban.189
V. CONCLUSION
Direct-mail solicitations, whether targeted or gen-
eralized, provide a means of ensuring access to legal
representation to the public. In addition, by inform-
ing persons in need of legal representation as to the
available resources, direct-mail solicitations serve to
benefit those who are unaware of their options.
In recent years, however, states have been anxious
to enforce new and improved disciplinary rules to
shield the public from what the states consider to be
distasteful and unprofessional behavior. Previously,
First Amendment protections outweighed these con-
cerns, but with the Supreme Court's most recent de-
cision, the scale may begin to tilt in the other
direction.
ent known to be in need of legal services in a particular
matter, and with whom the lawyer has no family or prior
professional relationship, shall include the words "Adver-
tising Material" on the outside of the envelope and at the
beginning and ending of any recorded communication.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(c)
(1989).
188 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2379
(1995).
189 However, this method would not be satisfactory to those
who are of the opinion that the mere receipt of the solicitation is
a serious invasion of their privacy.
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